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EMPATHY AND AFFECT: WHAT CAN EMPATHIED BODIES DO? 
 
George Marshall and Claire Hooker 
 
 
Abstract 
 
While there has been much interest in the apparent benefits of empathy in improving 
outcomes of medical care, there is continuing concern over the philosophical nature of 
empathy. We suggest that part of the difficulty in coming-to-terms with empathy is 
due to the modernist dichotomies that have structured Western medical discourse, 
such that doctor and patient, knower and known, cognitive and emotional, subject and 
object, are situated in oppositional terms, with the result that such accounts cannot 
coherently encompass an emotional doctor, or a patient as knower, or empathy as 
other than a possession or a trait. This paper explores what, by contrast, a radical 
critique of the Cartesian worldview, in the form of a Deleuzian theoretical framework, 
would open up in new perspectives on empathy. We extend the framework of 
emotional geography to ask what happens when people are affected by empathy. We 
suggest that doctors and patients might be more productively understood as embodied 
subjects that are configured in their capacities by how they are affected by singular 
‘events’ of empathy. We sketch out how the Deleuzean framework would make sense 
of these contention and identify some possible implications for medical education and 
practice.  
 
Introduction 
 
Empathy is widely acknowledged to be of great importance to the practice of 
medicine. It is considered to be an intrinsic good in itself – something that patients 
crave, a crucial responsiveness to the existential and psychosocial aspects of illness1- 
which, for many patients, may be the most significant features of illness2. Empathy is 
also considered to confer numerous instrumental benefits in medical practice. It 
facilitates doctor-patient communication and enhances mutual trust, producing a 
positive self-reinforcing cycle that can improve shared decision making, alert 
physicians to physical and psychosocial factors that affect diagnosis and treatment 
decisions, and help patients to comply with treatment regimens and develop positive 
health practices3 4. Empathy is good for doctors as well as patients. It can help avoid 
unpleasant or hostile interactions with patients and it confers significant satisfaction in 
relation to therapeutic goals5. 
 
There is substantial evidence, indeed, that empathy may produce positive therapeutic 
effects directly, and not merely by its facilitation of good communication and hence 
more effective medical care. Empathy has long been considered a key component of 
treatment in many psychotherapeutic traditions6 7. There is now extensive evidence 
about how significant positive human relationships are for all aspects of good health: 
such evidence has emerged, for example, in studies of child development, social 
determinants of health, neuroscience, and clinical care7; empathy is part, and possibly 
the key to, this strong association. There is certainly evidence that empathy produces 
therapeutic ‘context’ (aka ‘placebo’) effects, often very powerful ones. That is, 
empathy can directly produce therapeutic benefit. In some cases these effects have 
observable physiological mechanisms and correlates7. For example, there is recent 
evidence that empathic doctoring influences various physiological markers in patients 
with type II diabetes8. 
 
However, the importance of empathy in medicine and health care is at present 
matched by a very extensive scholarly literature on empathy in health and medicine 
(and beyond), that upon inspection proves to be philosophically vexed, internally 
contradictory, and subject to significant critique over the past decade4 9-11. Its 
vexations have been comprehensively examined elsewhere; here we are most 
concerned with the question of how empathy can be defined (if at all), and by 
corollary, whether empathy is either truly possible or desirable.  
 
To summarise a large literature briefly: for most (though not all) scholars, empathy is 
something more than simply feeling ‘sorry for’ a patient; it is considered to be about 
‘understanding’ that patient’s unique experience. But what that understanding consists 
of – literal neuronal replication or ‘mirroring’12? ‘emotional resonance’13? – and how 
we come by it has been at issue. Can one person (the doctor) ever ‘feel with’ or 
directly ‘share’ the subjective experience of the patient, as suggested by some of the 
more dominant formulations of empathy11? Or is one limited to listening and 
observing and imagining, in part from analogies and models, the qualities of another’s 
experience14? These questions are of some moment for doctors, who wish neither to 
project their own assumptions onto their patients’ experiences, nor to get the 
information wrong, and hence make an incorrect judgment about diagnosis or 
treatment. As a result, some accounts see empathy as a predominantly or solely 
cognitive response, while others view it as intrinsically emotional. Similarly some 
insist that empathy is distinctive because it grants direct access to another’s 
experience (and hence, may be measured for its accuracy), while others argue that it 
necessarily involves imagination and analysis.  
 
This paper seeks to address the problems with empathy ‘in theory’ by foregrounding 
the affective reality of medical consultations. Using insights from affect theory and 
some of the more recent developments in the understanding of human subjectivity in 
the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari we approach the problem of empathy 
from a different place; one intentionally situated in the affective reality of 
consultation. Such a stance allows us to move beyond the pre-given or ideal forms of 
doctor and patient that can be seen to overly define the possibilities of what happens 
in medical encounters.  In doing so we hope to suggest a different theory of empathy 
that will allow more practically useful definitions of empathy to emerge and thus 
enable further research into improving health encounters.  
 
 
Empathy and the problems of modernity 
 
Following Reidar Pedersen, Rebecca Garden and others, we argue that an underlying 
and problematic discursive structure unifies these apparently disparate and 
oppositional accounts: they are all structured by the polarized dichotomies between 
subject and object, knower and known, mind and body, active and passive, science 
and society, culture and nature, (and masculine and feminine) that underpin 
modernity4 7. Thus all these accounts reproduce the ideals of objectivity and neutrality 
in medicine, such that the subjectivity of the doctor, who is supposed to be both 
objective and neutral, is constantly elided, while the subjectivity of the patient is 
brought into view14. Similarly all these accounts construct empathic knowing as 
oppositional to, and hence needing to be kept in check by, the technical knowledge of 
medicine. In this way what empathy allows a doctor to understand is never anything 
about disease itself, or the patient’s physical functioning; empathy is directed towards 
understanding the psychosocial and emotional elements of patient experience (which 
may impinge on treatment success, and so are worth attention). Our accounts of 
empathy construct cognition and emotion as distinct polar opposites; while empathy 
allows the latter a place in medical practice, it constrains that place so that it does not 
disrupt the ideals of objectivity, disembodied knowing and neutrality. 
 
If, then we find that medical students and young doctors regularly lose empathy, we 
should not be surprised. It is because the sort of empathy they can have is of the 
constrained kind that occurs in a discourse in which technical knowledge and 
affective care are constructed as opposites and where being emotional, and having 
subjectivity (and a body) requires taking a subject position antithetical to that which 
defines the doctor. Or to say it in plainer language: so long as medicine is so 
fundamentally conceived around these dichotomies, only a weak and incoherent form 
of empathy will be available to us. The fact that empathy can (apparently) produce 
physiological change – something utterly inexplicable in the terms of current 
literature on empathy – is a practical demonstration of how both false and limiting 
these dichotomies are.  
 
We would like to comment here on four additional issues associated with the 
proposition that it is medicine’s conceptual allegiance to the ideological distinctions 
of modernity that so problematize current accounts of empathy. The first is to call 
attention to the relevance of Foucauldian perspectives for empathy in medicine, a 
point also raised briefly by Rebecca Garden in her critiques of narrative medicine 
more generally9. Foucault’s concept of ‘the gaze’ (le regard) and on the forms of 
power produced by the clinic has been a critical perspective on the practice and 
knowledge of biomedicine for some decades15. The ‘gaze’ describes medical ways of 
knowing that posit the doctor in the position of observer of the patient and his/her 
disease. This positioning objectifies the patient – that is, it produces the patient as the 
object of knowledge, a passive thing to be known; it is dehumanizing, separating the 
patient’s body from his or her personhood, and rendering it available to be 
manipulated and known. At the same time the doctor becomes invisible, positioned at 
the point from which things are seen and known, what Donna Haraway called a ‘view 
from nowhere’16.  
 
Empathy has been constructed as a means of bridging the gaze. But by using empathy 
as a way to ‘add on’ the ‘psychosocial’ dimensions of illness – the idea of ‘adding on’ 
implies that these are both separate and marginal to the biomedical aspects of illness – 
this version of empathy instead to reproduces the gaze, with its distributing capacity 
to mark out both the subject and the object, the gazer and the seen17. The gaze 
objectifies; empathy cannot rescue the patient from objectification, it just adds some 
colour to the object. Garden warns that narrative medicine, which sets out to critique 
the objectifying and reductionist qualities of biomedicine and to cultivate capacities 
for empathy in doctors, may often be just another form through which the doctor can 
come to regard the patient: the patient becomes a spectacle of suffering through 
which the doctor can demonstrate their virtue, commanding and sometimes 
appropriating the patient’s story11. Empathy may become a tool by which the doctor 
can exercise power - pastoral power, enacted with and through the patient by 
constructing them as a confessional subject, in need of medical understanding18. This 
is productive power, not repressive power, but it is nonetheless as constraining as it is 
enabling. Thus, we suggest that the Gaze overdetermines empathy, and this is a 
problem because it is of questionable ethics and works against the autonomy that 
empathy is nominally trying to give extension to. 
 
The second issue is that our conceptions of empathy have been fairly static and 
abstract entities. The metaphors we use matter for how we are able to conceive of 
things, and in accounts so far, empathy has been mostly imagined as a possession. 
Empathy either exists or it doesn’t; doctors ‘have’ it or they don’t; it is a cargo, or a 
level that may be measured; it is a set of mirror neurons, perhaps. This static 
conception of empathy doesn’t allow us to understand much about what changes 
when doctors ‘have’ empathy. Where does it come from – and how does it shift 
interactions and produce effects? Static models, or those that reduce the explanation 
to neurotransmitters, don’t tell us much about how empathy is experienced in patient 
encounters or what happens between the parties involved, and this insight is key for 
understanding, beyond a warm fuzzy glow, why empathy might matter.  
 
The third issue is that what is missing in all these accounts of empathy are bodies: the 
body of the empathizing doctor is entirely absent, while the body of the sick patient is 
considered relevant to the technicalities of medicine, but not to empathy. The doctor 
may have empathic understanding of the patient’s physical suffering or sensation, but 
neither feeling body is theorized as part of what empathy is or how it occurs.  
 
The fourth issue also concerns what accounts of empathy leave out. Currently 
empathy is understood in an entirely decontextualized fashion: as something germane 
to the interactions between a doctor and a patient, but not as something influenced by 
the time, location, space, or other aspects of the event. Empathy is thus separated 
from health services, hospital rooms, the epistemology of diagnoses, and all the other 
elements that were necessary to the two actors coming together. Yet the reality is that 
patient experience is heavily influenced by all these factors, and that what is soothed 
by empathy is rarely simply the experience of a pathology, but rather the pathology as 
a located lived experience, embedded in and produced by the set of institutions and 
social structures in which the patient is enmeshed.  
 
In what follows, therefore, we take Pedersen’s and Garden’s critiques of empathy 
seriously. We are interested in a theory of empathy that can engage with the 
specificities of the context in which it occurs. We are stimulated by Pedersen’s 
emphasis on the importance of hermeneutics in the doctor-patient encounter, and by 
Garden’s consciousness of the ways in which both that encounter and the notions of 
suffering and illness and virtuous action that structure it are discursively constituted. 
And we want a theory that can accommodate the many quotidian elements that are 
critical parts of health care experience.  
 
We think ‘empathy’ might seem like a very different phenomenon if detached from 
modernist constructions of medicine and indeed (as we suggest below) of subjectivity 
itself. Retheorising empathy in this way would be an interesting project for its own 
sake. But we’re also interested because of what insights into therapeutic interaction a 
less constrained version of empathy might open up. Here we’d like to recognise 
affective reality as primary to medical interactions, not just an add-on to the business 
of physiological intervention.  
 
Nor are we the only ones; very recent scholarship on empathy in medicine has 
similarly looked for innovations that could circumvent the problematic polarisations 
between cognition and emotion particularly. A critical shift that many of these works 
have made is to cease thinking of empathy as something we have and to being 
thinking of it as something we do. Thus several recent psychologically-based models 
of empathy incorporate affective, cognitive and behavioural elements, and draw out – 
literally – processes for how empathy occurs, mapping the pathways that link these 
elements4 19 20. Others have suggested that we understand empathy performatively, as 
something we enact, in ways very like – or the same as – emotional labour19. While 
these models do not disrupt or jettison polarities (but merely distribute where they are 
in the model and specify connections), this shift from having to doing, from static to 
dynamic models of empathy, open up many new possibilities and insights.  
 
We find this shift compelling and see a rich resource in the humanities that would 
enable further exploration of what empathy means in medical encounters. One of us 
has extended the application of a phenomenological approach to empathy4, 
appropriate in part because the concept originated in this philosophical context.  
Along the phenomenological line it may also be interesting to explore what a Satrean 
account of emotion could open up in our insights into empathy21. 
 
Here we add another possible version of it – a turn toward the more process oriented 
theories and philosophers of the past half century, as expanded by Gilles Deleuze22 
and also with his collaborator Felix Guattari23. In comparison with Michel Foucault, 
other Continental philosophers in the postmodern tradition have had surprisingly little 
attention within the medical humanities despite their enormous impact in the 
humanities in general24; though perhaps this is unsurprising, given the challenge that 
poststructuralist and postmodern positions pose to the canon of classic liberal arts 
education that has been so central in the medical humanities to date. Here we try out 
what those who start from a deliberately anti-Cartesian position can offer us in a 
novel theorization of empathy. We draw specifically upon affect theory and emotional 
geography. These theorists understand affects, that which is "more than and less than 
rational"25, as productive entities, an approach that can be traced to a resurgent 
interest in Spinozan affects26. At minimum, we argue that this perspective offers a 
way of understanding empathy that attends to its dynamic and transitory emergence in 
the specificities of health care: a located, embodied and performative empathy (or 
empathies); one sensible of its hermeneutics, and one in which both subjectivities are 
important. These are all key dimensions of empathy that become ‘invisible’ in other 
accounts.  
 
 
A different approach 
 
Let us begin with an illustration – an illustration of the ‘old’ concept of medical 
empathy. In his seminal paper on empathy in medicine, one of the early pieces of 
thought-provoking interest and advocacy that stimulated research and commentary in 
the area more than twenty years ago27, Howard Spiro relates an anecdote in which 
young doctors joke callously about a comatose elderly man until they see a card on 
the wall near his bed, saying ‘get well soon Grandpa’. This silences them: the patient 
is jerked from being a passive, physical object defined in terms of the workload and 
resources it demands, and in terms of the ineffective systems of medical care, 
suddenly back into personhood. The child’s love and grief become the focal point of a 
much more reverent response. (Or so we infer from the bare bones of this story). This, 
says Spiro, is empathy – at least for the child, if not quite for the patient. The cargo of 
empathy (his term) with which these students entered the study of medicine has been 
slowly jettisoned as a result of the cultivation of distance and dispassion through 
practices such as dissection and pathology and the weariness of residency – that is, 
through the objectifying gaze; but in this moment, a little of that cargo gets hauled 
back from the deep. 
 
At first glance, this anecdote, and the paper that surrounds it, illustrate our contentions 
above: in it empathy goes mostly undefined, but is considered as a possession; it lets 
in emotion, but in no way disrupts or connects with the technicalities of medicine. But 
the important part of this anecdote is not what characteristics the students ‘have’. It’s 
what happens that is important: that something changes. And to understand that, we 
have to start with how we understand the selves involved. We have to start by 
retheorising subjectivity.  
 
Becoming equal to what happens in theory: rethinking subjectivity 
 
While we may feel empathic happening as an affecting force, becoming sensible to 
what happened is helped by (we suggest: requires us) to turn away from the ‘rational’ 
‘cognitive’ approaches often associated with Cartesian and neo-Kantian thought. (Of 
course these days there are those who theorise both rationality and cognition in non-
Cartesian, multivalent ways, but the dominant modernist paradigm that construes 
rationality and cognition as opposite to emotion strongly persists in much medical and 
scientific discourse). Affect theorists made just this turn28. We suggest that we use the 
traditions of affect theory to help us see what happens in empathy. This is no easy 
move to make given the ubiquity of such rationalist cognitive approaches in western 
cultures. However we feel that it is a necessary one in order to see what changes if we 
use it to allow a different version of the reality of empathy to come into view.  
 
Theorising affect is often seen to require staking an alternative position to established 
ideas of mind and body. Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) famously rejected 
Descartes’ mind/body dualism, insisting rather that mind and the body ought to be 
understood as one thing29. He also saw personhood dynamically, as something that 
changed over time, and he framed personhood in terms of actions, rather than in terms 
of qualities or possessions.  Similarly, David Hume’s claim—that many of our 
emotional states arise from intersubjectivity (that is, arise from our engagement with 
others rather than being solely internally founded)—suggests that possibility that we 
could productively think about consciousness or existence in terms of continually 
evolving emotional transference constantly shaped by, and shaping, its context14. The 
first difficult move here is that affect theory sees subjectivity as contingent. It is not a 
thing. It is, itself, dynamic and constantly being produced.  
  
For affect theorists the body is not merely influenced after the fact by affectedness, 
which is how earlier versions of empathy would have it. You have a feeling (say, of 
identification with a patient), it affects you. Affect theorists go further and suggest 
that a body is determined in its capacities by how it is affected. A body’s capacities 
are also not things, but are also dynamic and constantly being produced; they are, 
therefore, transient. Such ideas challenge deeply held ideas of self and subjectivity 
that are dominant in both medical and broader western cultural models.  
 
Ideas of the self, and how a self relates to other selves, have long been predicated on 
the assumption that a conscious complete human precedes any interaction that 
follows. Affect theorists put forward an alternative to this limited view of selfhood 
when they suggest that the self is contingent upon interactions of embodied selves 
with both other human and non-human entities. A leading theorist of affect, Brian 
Massumi puts it thus: “The human is fractalized. It is dispersed across the nodes and 
transversed by them all in the endless complexity of relay”30.  
 
To understand this, we, like Massumi, will use Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s 
philosophical perspective to think about subjectivity. Together with his collaborator 
Guattari, Deleuze’s philosophical project was to build a metaphysics that matched 
developments in twentieth century science and society. This was, for him, a 
philosophy of difference24 31-33. This constantly-dynamic metaphysics is anti- 
foundationalist. In it, the concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance: things do 
not simply ‘exist’, they are dynamic, multiplicitous, transient entities. Similarly, event 
replaces essence and virtuality replaces possibility. In this philosophy, difference –the 
difference between self and self, between human and table or between any other two 
things, is no longer an empirical relation, because the things are not considered to 
have a prior existence. Instead, difference becomes a transcendental principle that 
constitutes the sufficient reason for empirical diversity. Thus, for example, it is the 
difference of electrical potential between cloud and ground that constitutes the 
sufficient reason of the phenomenon of lightning24; as it is the tendency to minimize 
difference in free energy that constitutes sufficient reason for the emergence of both 
surface tension minimizing bubbles from soap molecules, and bond energy 
minimizing crystals from sodium chloride solution34. 
 
A key conceptual term developed by Deleuze and Guattari is that of the ‘Body 
without Organs (BwO)’ to describe a primordial undifferentiated deeper reality 
underlying a whole that is constructed from parts. Traditional concepts of subjectivity, 
such as a doctor and a patient, give us the doctor and the patient as stable, separate 
identities and entities31. But these entities are really composed of sets of flows: ‘this 
body without organs is permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all 
directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory 
particles’23; they are always being reformed. The BwO does not pertain only to 
specific individual bodies (or persons), but also refers to the virtual dimension of 
reality (or ‘plane of immanence’), in general. This can be thought of as an infinite 
reservoir of all potentials for material being – sentient or otherwise. 
 
As a description of subjectivity, Deleuze and Guattari separate the pure affected body 
- the Body without Organs (BwO) - from the fixedly determined identity of any 
particular human organism. The BwO is traversed by intensities, is affected and 
affecting, is capable of achieving extension through human and non-human entities, is 
always becoming, and never quite fixedly human30. There is an inter-penetration of 
psychic experience and forces of society and nature31. By contrast, a body with organs 
is the transiently fixed body with a limited set of traits, habits, movements, affects, 
etc. In an elegant paper, Nick Fox has illustrated the utility of this perspective for 
medicine31. For example, it implies that we might allow the identity of the doctor and 
patient to remain unfixed, and instead, to be contingent upon a dynamic struggle of 
territorializing and de-territorializing effects of different psychic, biochemical, social 
and natural forces. That it is to say, diagnoses, medical discourses, different 
pharmacotherapies, cancer cells, etc, each reconfigure – transiently – the entities we 
call ‘a doctor’ and ‘a patient’. Such a dynamic understanding of personhood opens up 
how we see doing and being a doctor and patient; we can see where these transient 
entities emerge from and what in turn emerges next. This perspective also allows us to 
consider those aspects of empathy that are conspicuously missing in theory to date. 
 
But then how do we understand empathy – or perhaps we should say, but how then is 
empathy produced (is productive) - in the mileu of these deconstructed bodies, or in 
medical coming-togethers? Theorizing affect means giving a logical consistency to30 
or, becoming equal to35, the in-between. We repeat that Deleuze’s critique of the 
dominant philosophy of Plato, Descartes and Kant was that “intensive differences are 
subordinated to the extensive structures…they give rise to”36. That is, identity 
subsumed the processes that produced it. Similarly, we suggest that it is useful to see 
the intensive aspects of empathy as having been subsumed by their end product, 
conceptually speaking. That is, what we have seen is only the end product - the 
patient/doctor dyad – and not the processes of empathy as producing this product. 
Thus ‘old’ versions of empathy have mistakenly ascribed the capacity of empathy to 
affect change to this end product, that is, to a doctor-self whose response to a patient 
shifts their therapeutic relation. Now, instead of looking at stable identities that 
change because of empathy, we are looking at empathy as a thing that transiently 
produces these identities in particular ways. 
 
Becoming equal to what happens in theory: emotional geographies of empathy 
 
In this section we wish to outline a strategy that will allow an increasing awareness of 
the specific ways that context and bodies can be said to ‘interpenetrate’ to produce 
events of empathy.  Firstly, we define empathy as excessive. Time and again affect 
theorists emphasise Spinoza’s observation of the excessive nature of affects; that is, 
affects exceed what is, spill over, are productive. Exactly what affects are excessive to 
is the ideal or complete idea of things.  “What the complete determination lacks is the 
whole set of relations belonging to actual existence”22. In the particular case of 
empathy, the idea of the patient and the doctor have been central in predetermining 
the possibilities of empathy, a move that is counter to the actual and singular events 
through which empathy occurs. The set of relations that empathy implies meets this 
criteria of excess when they change things in consultation, by bringing new and 
unexpected directions or possibilities to the flow of the interaction. 
 
Secondly we define empathy not as an essential type or class of thing, but as unique 
emergences that are time and space dependent. If we think about empathy as singular 
events of empathy, or empathies, we again expose the limits of dominant theories.  
Empathy that is felt in consultation, cannot be understood in its excessiveness while 
retaining “the Kantian imperative to understand the conditions of possible experience 
as if from outside and above”30. Singular empathies are better understood in terms of 
the ‘plane of immanence’ (above), part of general reality. The idea of singular 
empathies also allows us to take account of the significant affective context in which 
these empathies emerge.  
 
Thirdly, we must have a way of coming to terms with the real existence of empathy in 
the milieu of medical coming-togethers. As we have seen, medical literature is 
plagued by metaphors of empathy as trait, level or quality (of a subject). But once we 
take a Deleuzean approach to subjectivity, these metaphors become meaningless. 
Instead, a Deleuzean approach would treat empathies, not as emotions or experiences, 
but as real material entities, part of the vast infinite reservoir of the virtual. The reader 
may well ask: in what sense can an entity like empathy be real? surely not as real as a 
doctor and a patient, or a scalpel?  But in the Deleuzean framework, the doctor, 
patient and scalpel are not ‘real’ either, in the sense of fixed entities that then have or 
create a moment of ‘empathy’; they are sets of flows, transiently produced by their 
difference from one another. Deleuze’s framework gives entities like empathy (and 
diagnoses, and cancer cells, etc) an equal ontological status – they are all temporary 
configurations, produced by and productive of forms of difference - that enables us to 
catch a glimpse of how empathy might actually work.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari developed a distinction between the possible and real, on one 
hand, and the virtual and actual on the other22. It is this insight that will allow us to 
consider empathies as real. The ‘possible’ is that which is an idea (or essence) that 
may achieve real expression in matter and which Deleuze rejects in favour of the 
‘real’, which he split into the virtual - entities that really exist and are capable of 
divergent actualization - and the actual, that which we experience36. We understand 
that singular empathies emerge from a consultation space that is prior, or at least 
simultaneous, to the identities of doctor and patient. In this sense empathy can 
become more than a (non-real) ideal, but be appreciated as real, singular, emergent 
(like a soap bubble) and having the capacity to configure affective space; to actualize 
specific ‘points of inflection’22. It is not that empathy changes what is possible for 
doctors and patients to achieve in medical consultation, but more radically, singular 
empathies produce particular doctor-bodies and patient-bodies by making them actual 
(that which we experience) through its operation.  
 
Let us now re-examine Spiro’s example of empathy. Firstly, Spiro’s empathy is an 
event which includes the intensities of the card and its linguistic and aesthetic content, 
the shared understanding of the junior doctors on seeing it, the contagion of shame 
that is jointly felt and multiplied presumably by the simultaneous recognition of 
affectedness between the bodies of the doctors, and which stands in such contrast to 
the jovial nature of the group in the moments prior; and all this in the presence of a 
body-patient; a man incapacitated and made an object of pity. This event of empathy 
can therefore be defined spatially; by the dimensions of different intensities operating 
across bodies. 
 
Secondly, this event of empathy is singular and emergent. That is not to say that this 
particular event, one may wish to categorise it as one of shame, is not repeatable in 
type (it is always possible to categorise). But it is more usefully conceived of as 
emerging from and shaping its context; the circulation of affects across bodies 
participating in this medical ‘coming-together’. 
 
Thirdly, the empathy described by Spiro is productive: it changes things. Whether it 
actually reflects a real event or is purely fictional, it affects us. If fictional, it remains 
an expression of the affectedness of the author who, like the little boy penning a get-
well card, is overflowing affectedness through the technology of the written word. 
Assuming it is a valid account of a real event, we can see how it reconfigures the 
bodies of the rounding doctors. It changes their behaviours in the moments, minutes, 
hours after the event, and perhaps even goes on to reconfigure their behaviours in 
their lives or medical careers. Whatever it did, the empathy event was transformative 
and productive and divergent, and presumably was told to Spiro and then written and 
communicated in such a way that the medical community could share in the felt 
experience (and…). Such is the capacity of the singular empathy in its excess to 
actualize difference from a virtual space. Empathies of this type defy capture in a 
static idea, but are continually expanding, affecting, ever outward. 
 
Our task in understanding empathy is, therefore, not to discover a generic category of 
configuration that we can seek to replicate and reproduce in order to continue the 
discursive work of medicine23. Instead, our task in understanding empathy is “much 
more singularly, endeavouring to configure a body and its affect/affectedness”26.  
 
This means becoming more aware of the affective reality of the consultation space 
that medical encounters occupy, as well as exploring the experience of medical 
subjectivities. As such we suggest conceiving of the affective aspects of empathy not 
as products of a discrete subjectivity, but as emerging within an ‘emotional 
geography’35 37 of bodies becoming ‘empathied’. Such a conception is useful in that it 
implies a transpersonal consistency of affect that is open to bodies and capable of 
divergent actualization22 36. Furthermore the concept of an emotional geography takes 
us away from the limitations of conceiving of empathy as a possession or as a limited 
action by a subject. Instead, empathy can now be conceived of as an emergence 
within a topological consistency that is capable of folding, flowing, having points of 
inflection; that is at times experienced as closed or impassable, or characterised by 
striations and limits, and at other times experienced as open and smooth leading to 
lines of flight23 38. Subjectivities are defined not in isolation, but from within and 
against the forces of these affecting spaces and their linguistic, physiological and non-
human extensions39. Singular empathies emerge and re-emerge across a real virtual 
space, continually redefining the space of consultations. Such an emotional geography 
can include all that is affected and affects the consultation space including doctors, 
patient, card, journals, medical language and communities, in short all that becomes 
enmeshed in the affectivity of the event. Not only do empathies change the content of 
the consultation, they can also change the parameters of consultation itself, which 
perhaps explains why we find empathy so powerful in medicine. In contradistinction 
to the classical doctor/patient dyad, which are – as we have seen – reproduced as 
separate and hierarchical in classical versions of empathy, affective empathies suggest 
a trans-subjective geography of interaction where overlapping subjects infold context 
and change the virtual space which they inhabit and lead to divergent actualization. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that existing models of medical empathy suppose a pre-existing and 
separated doctor and patient who are thought to interact through limited mechanism 
of communication: either body language, written or vocalised language. This model 
of empathy has always made intersubjectivity a dubious proposition. Further, in 
traditional accounts of empathy, emotions are troublesome - either suppressed in the 
pursuit of detachment (doctor) or subjected to inquiry (patient) for the goal of 
understanding. Such a limited construction is continually challenged by the actual 
empathic affectivity that is broadly acknowledged to be felt in medical consultations.  
 
Our understanding of affects suggest that the reality of singular empathy events would 
be excessive to this determination, that it would affect bodies, inserting itself into 
consultations when bodies come together in a given context. Such a reality is beyond 
the conception of classical metaphysics. As one of us has argued elsewhere, empathy 
unavoidably suggests a critique of the dualities of subject and object, cognitive and 
visceral, patient and doctor4. 
 
Importantly this account of affect is compatible with neurological capacities of 
individuals to mirror or anticipate others emotions, to learn behaviours, to enfold 
cultural fixings, or to have been shaped by evolutionary mechanisms whereby certain 
reactions or affective states may be ‘imprinted’40 in bodies. It does not deny that 
contexts affect the way empathy operates in a clinical consultation. Instead, a theory 
of affective empathies allows for the possibilities of all of the above complexities of 
medical contexts to operate via bodies coming-together. In Deleuzean language, we 
might say that residual traces of previous experience are in-folded within and 
territorialize the BwO, but are enacted and produced in singular ways during 
consultation where the BwO is affected anew. 
 
For medical students and doctors, their educators and organisers who are hoping to 
‘increase’ empathy, this view of affective empathy has significant implications.  
While some empathies may involve doctors seeking to cognitively convey empathy 
(for example, by reproducing certain acts or words that may convey it41), we suggest 
that the student of empathy needs to avoid presupposing what kind of empathy may 
be conveyed and the manner in which this may occur. Instead, and simply, we need to 
be open to becoming affected. A multiplicity of empathies is possible in a given 
situation, as there is a multiplicity of ways that a body can affect and be affected. 
Thus promoting empathy may mean taking measures to ensure that the doctor and 
patient are affectively present, to reduce affective states that might impede affective 
engagement (anxiety, stress, inattention, depression) and to allow medical students 
and doctors (probably unquantifiable) ways of being that are open to affectedness. 
This enables us to be cognizant of the multiple aspects of a situation – the space of a 
treatment or consulting room, the wearing of protective equipment, the ways in which 
note taking procedures disrupt or facilitate conversation, down to the subtle minutiae 
of tone, glance and touch – in which empathy might emerge and how it might affect 
us.   
 
Bodies may benefit from developing their capacities to affect and to become affected.  
Activities such as reading fiction42 or attending the theatre43 have been suggested as 
ways to increase an individual’s empathy.  We would however revise the 
interpretation of these findings and say that if such activities improve empathy, they 
would do so by configuring bodies toward being affected  (rather than a mechanism 
of cognitive ‘simulation’ of the other). Rather than increasing an individual’s 
‘empathy complement’, such activities enhance a body’s capacities to affect and be 
affected, opening them to shared affective states that cannot be separated from their 
emotional context (the theatre experience itself, where and how and why literature is 
experienced). It is the continuity of affect, the emotional geographies in art and life 
that form the space of affectivity, the BwO, from which individual empathies can then 
arise when bodies come together. Future research could consider the organisation of 
health around emotional geographies (in addition to existing arrangements in which 
flow of capital, or the abstractions of organs, or disease hierarchies can often 
determine the structure of health ‘systems’) or connect empathy theory with medical, 
architectural and cultural research identifying places of healing.  
 
We have outlined two projects here.  The first, following from critique of medical 
empathy in the literature is to sketch a theory of empathy through affect, one that 
takes into account the excessive capacity of empathy to change medical subjects and 
objects. The second and simultaneous project is to use the reality of empathy to 
further contribute to the affective turn and challenge existing ideology around the self 
and in particular medicalized bodies. Even those unpersuaded by the full extent of the 
positions outlined here may appreciate, by force of contrast, how different it is to 
understand empathy as transitory, performative, and dynamic, as opposed to static or 
purely cognitive; how different it is to understand the empathy as affecting and 
producing affects in others, as productive and hence active; to see how the body is 
intrinsic to empathy, one primary way one can be affected. Our application of a 
Deleuzean framework here is very much merely a beginning; a full Deleuzean 
theorisation together with its implications for practice may find many possibilities not 
discussed here. These new vistas are enticing. Empathy as located, embodied, 
performative, and productive – these are novel and very productive features of 
empathy to bring into view.  
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